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ALITO, Circuit Judge: 
 
 Defendant Amana Refrigeration, Inc. ("Amana"), a 
manufacturer of home appliances, appeals a judgment for 
$9,375,000 in favor of plaintiff Cooper Distributing Co., Inc. 
("Cooper"), a distributor of Amana home appliances.  After 
supplying Cooper with its products for approximately 30 years, 
Amana attempted to terminate its relationship with Cooper. Cooper 
sued, claiming that the termination and the circumstances 
surrounding it gave rise to a variety of state law claims.  At 
trial, Cooper asserted four claims against Amana:  (1) illegal 
termination of a franchise, in violation of the New Jersey 
Franchise Practices Act ("NJFPA" or "the Act"), N.J.S.A. § 56:10-
1 et seq.; (2) breach of contract; (3) breach of the implied 
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obligation of good faith and fair dealing; and (4) tortious 
interference with prospective business advantage.  At the 
conclusion of a five-week trial, the jury returned a verdict of 
liability on all four counts and awarded damages as follows:  (1) 
$4.375 million on Cooper's NJFPA claim, (2) $2 million on 
Cooper's breach of contract claim, (3) $0 on Cooper's claim for 
breach of the obligation of good faith and fair dealing, (4) $0 
in actual damages on Cooper's tortious interference claim, and 
(5) $3 million in punitive damages on Cooper's tortious 
interference claim.  The district court upheld the entire 
$9,375,000 verdict and denied Amana's post-trial motions 
attacking the liability verdicts on Cooper's NJFPA, the breach of 
contract, and the tortious interference claims.   
 Amana appeals from the district court's denial of these 
motions, and Cooper cross-appeals from the district court's 
denial of its motion for prejudgment interest on its NJFPA claim. 
For the reasons discussed below, we (1) affirm the district 
court's denial of Amana's post-trial motions attacking the NJFPA 
claim, (2) reverse the district court's denial of Amana's motion 
for a new trial on NJFPA damages, remanding for a new trial on 
damages, (3) reverse the district court's denial of Amana's 
motion for judgment as a matter of law on the breach of contract 
claim, (4) reverse the award of punitive damages on Cooper's 
tortious interference claim, and (5) affirm the denial of 
Cooper's motion for prejudgment interest on its NJFPA claim.   
 
 I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
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 Amana began to manufacture home appliances in the 
1940's.  App. 3954.  Currently, Amana is a "full line" home 
appliance manufacturer:  it offers for sale a full set of home 
appliances, including refrigerators, cooking and laundry 
appliances, dishwashers, and air conditioners.  App. 680.  For 
many years, Amana employed a two-step process in the distribution 
of its products.  It would sell its products to a network of 
independent wholesale distributors, who, pursuant to agreements 
with Amana, would sell to retail dealers located in the wholesale 
distributors' contractually recognized sales regions.  The retail 
dealers would then sell the products to consumers.   
 Cooper began operating as an independent wholesale 
distributor in 1931.  App. 3954.  In 1961, Cooper started to 
distribute Amana products.  Cooper and Amana signed an agreement 
permitting Cooper to distribute Amana's products in New Jersey 
and New York and have periodically signed new agreements over the 
years.  Their most recent Distribution Agreement (the 
"Agreement"), which was signed in 1990, allowed Cooper to 
distribute Amana products in New Jersey, New York, Connecticut, 
and Pennsylvania.  App. 3978-3983.  The Agreement stated that it 
was to be construed "in accordance with the laws of the State of 
Iowa."  App. 3982.   
 Beginning in the late 1970's, the majority of Cooper's 
business (78% to 100%) was derived from the sale of Amana 
products.  App. 644.  Cooper also distributed other major brands 
of appliances, including Hardwick, In-Sink-Erator, and Dacor, 
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App. 959, although Amana occasionally subjected Cooper to 
competitive restraints.  App. 961-62. 
 During its relationship with Amana, Cooper operated a 
showroom/marketing center, first in Newark and subsequently in 
Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey.  Cooper used this facility for 
Amana product demonstrations, App. 2005-08, dealer training in 
Amana products, App. 2006, and dealer open houses.  App. 690. 
Cooper's sales managers studied the Amana product line, App. 
2013-2017, and in turn gave Amana product training to retail 
dealers.  App. 690-92.  Cooper also placed Amana advertisements 
in the yellow pages and newspapers, App. 1021-22, advertised as 
an authorized Amana servicer, App. 4016-17, instructed its 
servicemen to wear Amana uniforms, App. 1963, distributed 
promotional items bearing the Amana name, App. 1023, and, 
pursuant to the Agreement, promised to "use its best efforts to 
promote sales" of Amana products.  App. 3979.  Cooper's dealers 
perceived Amana and Cooper as being one and the same.  App. 1748. 
 In the early 1980's, the marketing of appliances began 
to change, and by the late 1980's most full-line manufacturers 
had eliminated the first step in the two-step distribution 
process.   App. 1169, 1679-81.  Instead of selling to wholesale 
distributors, the manufacturers sold directly to retail dealers. 
Consistent with this trend, Amana started to depart from its 
previous practice of selling its products to the wholesale 
distributors.  Instead, Amana began to sell directly to certain 
retail dealers located in the wholesale distributors' sales 
regions.  Amana first sold its appliances directly to "national" 
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retail dealers like Sears.  App. 988.  The Agreement explicitly 
permitted Amana to make such sales to national retailers.  App. 
3981.  Then, in the summer of 1991, Amana went further.  Relying 
on a provision of the Agreement that reserved for Amana the 
"right to make sales directly," App. 3981, Amana began to deal 
directly for the first time with a non-national retail dealer in 
Cooper's region, P.C. Richard & Son ("P.C. Richard").  P.C. 
Richard had a chain of 20 retail stores and represented Cooper's 
largest account.  App. 3955.  Amana also sold its products 
directly to other smaller local retail dealers.  Until Amana 
began selling to the national and local retailers, Cooper had 
been the exclusive distributor in its region for nearly 30 years. 
App. 988, 2504-06. 
 At the same time that the home appliance industry saw 
the elimination of two-step distribution, Amana's marketing 
responsibilities changed.  Amana's parent company, Raytheon, 
which also sold other appliance brands such as Speed Queen and 
Caloric, decided to consolidate the distribution of its brands. 
App. 2322-23.  The result was that several of the distributors 
that sold one but not all of Raytheon's brands were eliminated. 
In November 1991, Amana terminated its relationship with Cooper 
pursuant to a provision of the Agreement that allowed either 
party to terminate the Agreement on ten days written notice. App. 
3981.  At the same time, Amana also terminated its relationships 
with 20 of the other 23 remaining Amana wholesale distributors 
across the country.  App. 2825. 
8 
 In response to its termination, Cooper commenced this 
action in New Jersey state court alleging, among other things, 
that Amana had (1) violated section 5 of the NJFPA, N.J.S.A. 
§56:10-5, by terminating Cooper's franchise without good cause; 
(2)  breached the 1990 Agreement by selling to the local 
retailers in Cooper's region; (3) breached the Agreement's 
implied obligation of good faith and fair dealing; and (4) 
tortiously interfered with Cooper's prospective economic 
advantage.  App. 26-46.  In November 1991, the state court issued 
a temporary restraining order prohibiting termination of or 
interference with Cooper's Amana distributorship.  App. 2157. 
After the case was removed by Amana to federal court,0 a 
preliminary injunction was entered on February 10, 1992, 
enjoining Amana "from taking any action whatsoever to limit . . . 
or in any way interfere with Cooper's activities as a distributor 
of Amana products."0  App. 100-54, 2157.  
 During the pendency of the injunction, Amana dropped 
Cooper from its mailing list, thereby allegedly leaving Cooper --
and Cooper's retail dealers -- unaware of Amana discounts and 
model changes.  App. 1067-73.  Additionally, Amana refused to 
support Cooper in its attempt to sell Amana air conditioners to 
                     
0Cooper was incorporated and had its principal place of business 
in New Jersey; Amana was a Delaware Corporation with its 
principal place of business in Amana, Iowa.  The district court 
properly exercised jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441. 
0The Attorney General of the State of New Jersey intervened 
because Amana raised a Commerce Clause challenge to the 
extraterritorial application of the NJFPA.  We have since held 
that the NJFPA does not violate the Commerce Clause.  See 
Instructional Systems, Inc. v. Computer Curriculum Corp. 35 F.3d 
813 (3d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1176 (1995). 
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Trader Horn, one of Cooper's larger retail dealers.  App. 1047-
61. 
 Trial commenced in February 1994, and after five weeks 
the jury returned a verdict for Cooper totalling $9.375 million. 
The jury first found that Cooper had proved that it possessed a 
franchise under the NJFPA and that Amana's attempted termination 
violated the Act.  For this violation, the jury awarded Cooper 
$4.375 million in compensatory damages, a sum that corresponded 
to the value of the franchise in November 1991, as estimated by 
Cooper's expert.  The jury also awarded Cooper $2 million on its 
breach of contract claim, finding that the Agreement had granted 
Cooper an exclusive regional distributorship and that Amana had 
violated the Agreement by selling directly to P.C. Richard and 
other local retailers.  The jury likewise found for Cooper on its 
claims for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing and for tortious interference with prospective business 
advantage.  With respect to the tortious interference claim, the 
jury found that Amana had tortiously interfered with Cooper's 
business relations both by its direct sales to Cooper's local 
retail dealers and by other unjustifiable conduct occurring after 
the entry of the preliminary injunction.  Although the jury 
awarded no actual damages to Cooper on either the implied 
covenant or tortious interference claims, it did award $3 million 
in punitive damages on the tortious interference claim. 
 After trial, the district court entered judgment for 
Cooper in the amount of $9,375,000 and dissolved the preliminary 
injunction.  App. 5000-02.  Amana moved for post-trial judgment 
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as a matter of law pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b) and, 
alternatively, for a new trial pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a). 
Amana argued:  (1) that it was entitled to a judgment or a new 
trial as to liability under the NJFPA; (2) that it was entitled 
to a new trial as to damages on the NJFPA claim; (3) that it was 
entitled to a judgment or a new trial as to liability for breach 
of contract; (4) that it was entitled to judgment on the tortious 
interference claim; and (5) that it was entitled to judgment or a 
new trial on the issue of punitive damages.  App. 4927-77. 
 Cooper moved for attorneys' fees and costs under the 
NJFPA and for prejudgment interest on its breach of contract and 
NJFPA recoveries.  The district court rejected all of Amana's 
post-trial arguments, App. 5702-25, and awarded Cooper attorneys' 
fees and costs, App. 5726-36, and prejudgment interest on the 
breach of contract claim.  However, the district court denied 
Cooper's request for prejudgment interest on the NJFPA claim. 
App. 5737-41.  Amana appealed, challenging the denial of its 
post-trial motions.  Cooper cross-appealed, seeking additional 
prejudgment interest.  We turn first to the NJFPA issues. 
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II.  NEW JERSEY FRANCHISE PRACTICES ACT 
 Prompted in large part by the practices of automobile 
manufacturers and major oil companies, New Jersey enacted the 
NJFPA in 1971.  See Instructional Systems, Inc. v. Computer 
Curriculum Corp., 614 A.2d 124, 132 (N.J. 1992) (hereinafter 
"ISI").  The Act protects franchisees against indiscriminate 
termination by providing that "it shall be a violation of this 
act for a franchisor to terminate, cancel, or fail to renew a 
franchise without good cause."   N.J.S.A. § 56:10-5.  A franchise 
exists under the NJFPA if: (1) there is a "community of interest" 
between the franchisor and the franchisee; (2) the franchisor 
granted a "license" to the franchisee; and (3) the parties 
contemplated that the franchisee would maintain a "place of 
business" in New Jersey.  N.J.S.A. §§ 56:10-3a,-4.  Contending 
that it was not properly held liable under the NJFPA, Amana 
argues, first, that as a matter of law Cooper was not a 
"franchisee" under the Act0 and second, that the district court 
gave the jury prejudicially erroneous instructions on the NJFPA 
claim.  We will discuss each of these arguments in turn.   
 A.  Franchisee as a matter of law. 
                     
0Amana does not argue that the termination of its business 
relationship with Cooper was for "good cause," a concept that is 
"limited to failure by the franchisee to substantially comply 
with those requirements imposed upon him by the franchise." 
N.J.S.A. § 56:10-5; see also Westfield Centre Services, Inc. v. 
Cities Service Oil Co., 432 A.2d 48, 55 (N.J. 1981) (holding that 
a franchisor who in good faith and for bona fide reasons 
terminates a franchise for any reason other than substantial 
nonperformance has violated the Act). 
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 In reviewing a district court order denying a post-
trial motion for a Rule 50(b) judgment as a matter of law, we 
"determine whether the evidence and justifiable inferences most 
favorable to the prevailing party afford any rational basis for 
the verdict."  Intermilo, Inc. v. I.P. Enterprises, Inc., 19 F.3d 
890, 892 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting Bhaya v. Westinghouse Elec. 
Corp., 832 F.2d 258, 259 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 
1004 (1989)); see also Cassidy Podell Lynch, Inc. v. 
SnyderGeneral Corp., 944 F.2d 1131, 1137 (3d Cir. 1991).  We will 
apply this standard to each of the three franchise requirements.  
  1.  Community of interest. 
 The NJFPA requires a franchisee to show that it has a 
"community of interest" with a franchisor.  N.J.S.A. § 56:10-3a. 
The New Jersey Supreme Court has explained: 
Community of interest exists when the terms 
of the agreement between the parties or the 
nature of the franchise business requires the 
licensee, in the interest of the licensed 
business's success, to make a substantial 
investment in goods or skills that will be of 
minimal utility outside the franchise. 
 
ISI, 614 A.2d at 1 (quoting Cassidy, 944 F.2d at 1143).  The 
court continued: 
The Act's concern is that once a business has 
made substantial franchise-specific 
investments [which are of minimal utility 
outside the franchise,] it loses virtually 
all of its bargaining power. . . . 
Specifically, the franchisee cannot do 
anything that would risk termination, because 
that would result in a loss of much or all of 
the value of its franchise-specific 
investments.  Thus, the franchisee has no 
choice but to accede to the demands of the 
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franchisor, no matter how unreasonable these 
demands may be. 
 
ISI, 614 A.2d at 141; see also Neptune T.V. & Appliance Service, 
Inc. v. Litton Microwave Cooking Products Div., 462 A.2d 595, 601 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1983) (looking to the "vulnerability 
of the alleged franchisee"). 
 Thus, in order to find a "community of interest," two 
requirements must be met: (1) the distributor's investments must 
have been "substantially franchise-specific", ISI, 614 A.2d at 
141, and (2) the distributor must have been required to make 
these investments by the parties' agreement or the nature of the 
business.  N.J.S.A. § 56:10-3a.  New Jersey American, Inc. v. The 
Allied Corporation, 875 F.2d 58, 64 (3d Cir. 1989); see also Colt 
Industries, Inc. v. Fidelco Pump & Compressor Corp., 844 F.2d 
117, 120-121 (3d Cir. 1988) (affirming district court's finding 
of a lack of community of interest because the franchise-specific 
investments were "suggested, not required").  In this appeal, 
Amana has not addressed the second of these requirements,0 but 
                     
0Because Amana's briefs do not raise or address the question 
whether Cooper was required to make any franchise-specific 
investments that were made, we do not believe that that question 
is properly before us.  In any event, however, we believe that 
there was sufficient evidence to satisfy this requirement.  The 
nature of the business required Cooper to acquire Amana-specific 
knowledge since, without such knowledge, it would have been 
unable to educate the retail dealers about Amana's unique 
products.  Amana conceded that such dealer training was "vital" 
to the successful marketing of Amana products.  App. 834, 2012. 
In addition, the nature of the home appliance industry mandated 
that Cooper make certain goodwill investments, like purchasing 
advertising, that benefitted Amana.  App. 1566.  Also, Cooper was 
required to implement marketing strategies that were dictated by 
Amana and were designed to create goodwill.  App. 834-35. 
Finally, although Cooper was not required to limit its 
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Amana has strenuously argued that Cooper failed to meet the first 
of these requirements, i.e., that it failed to show that its 
investments were substantially franchise-specific.  
 The question of substantial franchise-specificity 
depends on whether Cooper's investments were "useful beyond the 
relation the contract in question create[d]."  Cassidy, 944 F.2d 
at 1144.  Amana argues that Cooper's investments -- specifically 
(1) Cooper's knowledge of home appliances, (2) its goodwill, and 
(3) its tangible assets -- were "tremendously useful" outside the 
context of its relationship with Amana, New Jersey American, 875 
F.2d at 64, and therefore were not substantially franchise-
specific.0  Although we do not find Cooper's evidence on this 
point to be overwhelming, we conclude that a reasonable jury 
could have found that Cooper's assets were substantially 
franchise-specific. 
 First, we note that Cooper made a significant 
investment in the acquisition of knowledge about Amana products. 
In Cassidy, we held that a franchise-specific investment could 
take the form of the "years of effort required to gain 
specialized skills or knowledge valuable to market the licensed 
product efficiently, but of little use beyond that."  Cassidy, 
                                                                  
distributing solely to Amana products, App. 959, Amana imposed 
various competitive restraints.  App. 961-62, 171-172.  Thus, a 
reasonable jury could have concluded that Cooper was required to 
make its franchise-specific investments. 
0As an example of a franchise-specific investment, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court noted that "McDonald's franchisees were required 
for many years to purchase and install `Golden Arches,' which 
[would be] of little value if the franchise were lost." ISI, 614 
A.2d at 141. 
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944 F.2d at 1144.  Here, Cooper introduced evidence that its 
employees invested much time over the years in acquiring 
knowledge about Amana products and that this knowledge was not 
transferable outside the Amana-franchise context.  Robert Nathan, 
a Cooper sales manager, testified that he spent 200 hours a year 
(10% of his time) learning about Amana products, App. 2013, and 
that much of what he and his sales force learned during this time 
related to Amana products that contained "exclusive or unique 
features not generally found in comparable products performing 
the same purpose in the marketplace."  App. 2014; see also App. 
2015-17; 1964-70 (identifying unique Amana features).  He added 
that this knowledge would be "of no value," App. 2027, and 
"useless," App. 1968-69, outside the realm of Amana sales.0   
 Second, and perhaps most important, a reasonable jury 
could find that one of Cooper's most important assets was 
franchise-specific goodwill.  It is clear that goodwill can 
constitute a franchise-specific asset.  See New Jersey American, 
875 F.2d at 62; ISI, 614 A.2d at 144; Neptune, 462 A.2d at 599. 
To qualify, however, the goodwill in question must be useful for 
                     
0Amana contends that since its products change yearly, Cooper's 
knowledge of Amana's products would become obsolete in time.  
Therefore, Amana maintains, the termination did not cause Cooper 
to lose the value of its franchise-specific knowledge. This 
argument, however, merely shows that Cooper's Amana-specific 
knowledge, like virtually any other asset, was subject to 
depreciation.  Thus, this argument does not show that Cooper's 
Amana-specific knowledge was valueless.  On the contrary, we 
believe that a reasonable jury could conclude that, as of the 
date of termination, Cooper's Amana-specific knowledge still 
retained substantial value. See, e.g., App. 2012-19 (sales 
manager Nathan discussing how his vast product knowledge would be 
rendered useless by termination). 
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the alleged franchisee only in the context of its relationship 
with the alleged franchisor.  Moreover, if a distributor sells 
the products of many manufacturers and creates some goodwill for 
all or many of these manufacturers, that kind of goodwill "cannot 
be enough to create a `community of interest.'"  ISI, 614 A.2d at 
141.0   
 In this case, it is undisputed that Cooper's 
investments created goodwill.  See App. 1023 (promotional items 
bearing the Amana name); App. 1021-22 (yellow page and newspaper 
advertising of Amana products); App. 1025 (in-store 
demonstrations of Amana products).  Further, there is evidence in 
the record that goodwill accounted for nearly half the value of 
the Cooper franchise.  App. 1813-16, 4605 (Cooper valuation 
expert, Melvin Konner, determining the value of the franchise and 
the portion of the value attributable to goodwill).   
 In addition, Cooper provided substantial evidence that 
much of this goodwill was not transferable.  For example, sales 
                     
0As the ISI court elaborated: 
 
To develop goodwill generally for a product 
cannot be enough to create a community of 
interest.  Otherwise, any licensee 
distributing a brand-name product could claim 
it has a community of interest with its 
supplier.  For example, a department store 
selling Sony name products could claim a 
community of interest with the manufacturer 
despite the fact that the department store's 
goodwill investments are not intimately tied 
to the manufacturer and therefore lack the 
economic character of genuine franchise 
investments. 
 
614 A.2d at 141. 
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manager Nathan explained that it was not possible for Cooper's 
salespeople, after representing for many years that Amana's 
products were superior, to claim, after the termination, that 
another product was even better.  App. 3238 ("I've been telling 
everybody Amana's the greatest thing since love the last 12 
years, and now I got to go out and say wait a second, we have 
this other line called Friederich, it's the greatest thing since 
love.  Who's going to believe that.").  Even Michael Napoletano, 
a retail dealer who testified for Amana, admitted that Cooper 
would have a credibility problem if it took such an approach. 
App. 2806-07.     
 This point is supported by the New Jersey Supreme 
Court's decision in ISI.  There, the court held that Computer 
Curriculum Corp. ("CCC"), a producer of computer learning 
systems, had a community of interest with Instructional Systems, 
Inc. ("ISI"), a regional distributor of CCC's products.  Part of 
the reason that the court found the existence of a community of 
interest was that ISI's previous efforts at creating goodwill for 
CCC's products gave rise to a credibility problem for ISI outside 
the CCC context.  The court explained: 
For close to twenty years, ISI has persuaded 
its customers to choose the CCC's system. The 
goodwill . . . would vanish in the event of a 
termination. 
ISI, 614 A.2d at 144; see also id. ("ISI's competitors, including 
CCC, would denigrate ISI with references to its prior endorsement 
of the CCC product line."). 
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 It is also noteworthy that Cooper's customers, the 
retail dealers, viewed Cooper and Amana as "one and the same." 
App. 2796-97; see also id. at 1748 ("Amana was Cooper, Cooper was 
Amana").  This fact lends support to the conclusion that Cooper's 
investments in goodwill were not transferable.  See ISI, 614 A.2d 
at 145 (relying on the fact that "the evidence revealed that 
ISI's customers considered ISI and CCC as synonymous").  
 Finally, we consider Cooper's investments in tangible 
assets.  The NJFPA protects franchise-specific "tangible capital 
investments, such as `a building designed to meet the style of 
the franchise, special equipment useful only to produce the 
franchise product, and franchise signs.'"  ISI, 614 A.2d at 141 
(quoting New Jersey American, 875 F.2d at 62).  In this case, 
Cooper introduced evidence showing that it had invested in some 
tangible items that were of no value outside the Amana-franchise 
context --  for example, the display housing for Cooper's 
showroom bearing the Amana logo, App. 1034, Amana product 
literature, App. 1032, and Amana demonstration models.  
 We do not mean to imply that all of Cooper's 
investments were Amana-specific.  On the contrary, the record 
shows that Cooper possessed assets that would clearly be useful 
outside the Amana context.  See, e.g., App. 1041 (electronic mail 
system), App. 1032-22 (computer system), App. 1036-37 (repair 
tools).0   However, the jury was not required to find that 
                     
0The parties dispute whether Cooper's investment in Amana 
inventory, App. 3343-45, and whether its investment in the 
showroom, the parts display area, and the service office, App. 
1034-38, were franchise-specific.  Because we believe that 
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Cooper's investments were entirely franchise-specific but merely 
that they were "substantial[ly] franchise-specific."  ISI, 614 
A.2d at 141 (emphasis added).  Looking at all of the evidence of 
Cooper's investments in the light most favorable to Cooper, we 
hold that a jury reasonably could conclude that Cooper's assets 
were substantially franchise-specific. 
 This holding is supported further by the fact that, as 
of the termination, 85% of Cooper's revenues were derived from 
Amana products.  App. 664, 679-80, 987-88.0  While we have held 
that dependence on a single supplier cannot automatically qualify 
a distributor for protection under the Act (or else "all 
exclusive distributors could unilaterally decide to convert their 
distributorships into franchises," Cassidy, 944 F.2d at 1141), 
the New Jersey Supreme Court has characterized economic 
dependence as perhaps the "most important" factor in determining 
whether a community of interest exists.  ISI, 614 A.2d at 145.  
  
  2.  License.    
 Before a party may be deemed a "franchisee" subject to 
the Act's protections, it must show that it has been granted "a 
license to use a trade name, trade mark, service mark, or related 
                                                                  
Cooper's investments were substantially franchise-specific even 
if these particular investments were not, we need not decide 
these disputes.     
 
0The Act states that a distributor cannot be a franchisee if it 
derives 20% or less of its gross sales from its franchisor, see 
N.J.S.A. § 56:10-4, implying "that a firm may be a franchise even 
if only 21% of its gross sales are derived from the franchisor."  
New Jersey American, 875 F.2d at 63. 
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characteristic[]."  N.J.S.A. § 56:10-3a.  The New Jersey Supreme 
Court has explained that "the Act's `license to use' requirement 
does not encompass a definition of license in the word's broadest 
sense, that is:  permission to do something [that] without the 
license would not be allowable."  ISI, 614 A.2d at 138. 
Accordingly, the mere fact that Cooper was permitted to use the 
Amana insignia, an act that would normally "not be allowable" due 
to trademark laws, did not in itself create a license. Otherwise, 
"any business selling a name brand product would, under New 
Jersey law, necessarily be considered as holding a license."  
ISI, 614 A.2d at 138 (quoting Colt Industries, Inc. v. Fidelco 
Pump & Compressor Corp., 844 F.2d 117, 120 (1988)). Instead, the 
term "license" is more narrowly defined.  It means "to use as if 
it is one's own.  It implies a proprietary interest . . . ."  
Finlay & Assoc., Inc. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 369 A.2d 541, 546 
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1976), aff'd on other grounds, 382 A.2d 
933 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.), certif. denied, 391 A.2d 483 
(N.J. 1978).  The New Jersey Supreme Court has further explained: 
 
At a minimum, the term "license" means that 
the alleged franchisee must use the name of 
the franchisor "in such a manner as to create 
a reasonable belief on the part of the 
consuming public that there is a connection 
between the . . . licensor and the licensee 
by which the licensor vouches, as it were, 
for the activity of license."  Neptune, 402 
A.2d at 599. 
 
ISI, 614 A.2d at 138; see also Neptune, 462 A.2d at 599 (noting 
that the hallmark of a license is that the franchisor gives its 
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approval to the franchisee's business enterprise with regard to 
the franchisor's product such that the public is induced "to 
expect from [the franchisee] a uniformly acceptable and quality 
controlled service endorsed by [the franchisor] itself").   
 Amana maintains that it did not vouch for Cooper's 
activities in relation to the Amana name.  We hold, however, that 
a reasonable jury could have inferred the existence of a 
"license" based on various aspects of the lengthy Amana-Cooper 
relationship.  We note that Cooper's showroom displayed the Amana 
sign, App. 723-24, and Cooper's servicemen wore Amana uniforms. 
App. 1963, 4077.  In these respects, this case resembles Cassidy, 
where the distributor "maintained signs bearing [the 
manufacturer's] name" at its facility and employed "servicemen 
[who] wore uniforms bearing the [manufacturer's] tradename." 
Cassidy, 944 F.2d at 135. 
 There was also evidence that Cooper's employees, like 
those of the plaintiff in ISI, were "integrally related" to the 
proper functioning of Amana products, ISI, 614 A.2d at 139, and 
this relationship could reasonably be viewed as likely to 
strengthen the public perception that Amana vouched for Cooper's 
use of its name.  The Agreement required Cooper to give 
"warranty" service on the Amana product line.  App. 3801, 794. 
Cooper advertised as a "servicer" of Amana products, App. 4016-
17, and on occasion made in-home visits to consumers with product 
problems.  App. 1743-44.  Cooper was responsible for fixing 
certain defective Amana products, App. 809-810, was an 
"authorized [Amana] parts distributor," App. 4011-4014, and could 
22 
give "factory authorized service."  App. 4016-17.  Amana itself 
also emphasized that Cooper's customer service was important so 
that customers would distinguish Amana from other manufacturers, 
App. 808, and Amana stressed that it was "vital" for Cooper to 
train its dealers in the "unique" features of Amana products. 
App. 834.  See also App. 17, 2012.0 
 It is likewise noteworthy that Cooper was the exclusive 
Amana distributor to local dealers in Cooper's four-state 
territory for 30 years, App. 988, 2504-06, and that Amana allowed 
Cooper to maintain advertisements in the yellow pages and 
newspapers stating that it was an authorized distributor and 
servicer of Amana products.  App. 4011-21.  In ISI, the New 
Jersey Supreme Court found these factors to be highly important. 
See ISI, 614 A.2d at 139-140.0 
                     
0Amana argues that ISI is distinguishable since the court there 
noted that the franchisee "educate[d] and train[ed] users" of the 
franchisor's product, ISI, 614 A.2d at 139 (emphasis added), 
while Cooper only trained dealers.  We can see no significance in 
this distinction for present purposes.  Under the Agreement, 
Cooper sold to dealers, not consumers.  App. 3979.  It therefore 
follows that the public, for the purposes of determining whether 
a perception existed that Amana vouched for Cooper, must be the 
dealers, not the consumers.  This is buttressed by the fact that 
the Act expressly applies to wholesalers, who do not typically 
sell to consumers.  See N.J.S.A. § 56:10-3(a) (noting that Act 
applies to "the marketing of goods or services at wholesale, 
retail, . . . or otherwise") (emphasis added). 
0Amana claims that ISI is distinguishable in this regard because 
ISI was required to hold itself out as a CCC distributor, see ISI 
614 A.2d at 139, whereas Cooper was merely allowed to hold itself 
out as an Amana distributor.  We find this distinction to be 
without merit because in Neptune, a case upon which the ISI court 
relied heavily, the court found a license despite the fact that 
the plaintiff was merely allowed to hold itself out as an 
authorized service center for the defendant. See Neptune, 462 
A.2d at 599. 
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 It is also significant that Cooper was required under 
the Agreement to use its best efforts to promote Amana sales. 
App. 3979.  In ISI, the New Jersey Supreme Court found it 
significant that the franchisee was required to use its best 
efforts to promote the franchisor's name.  614 A.2d at 139.0 
Amana tries to distinguish ISI by pointing to the difference 
between promoting the sale of a company's products and promoting 
its name.  See Liberty Sales Assoc., Inc. v. Dow Corning Corp., 
816 F. Supp. 1004, 1011 (D.N.J. 1993).  However, at least in the 
context of this case -- where Cooper sold Amana's entire product 
line and was Amana's sole distributor to dealers within the 
relevant region for 30 years -- this distinction is ephemeral. 
 Finally, there was additional testimony by Cooper's 
dealers and by Amana witnesses that strongly suggested that a 
"license" was present.  Retail dealer Michael Napoletano, who 
testified for Amana, admitted that "Amana vouches for Cooper by 
standing behind the quality of what it sells."  App. 2792. 
Moreover, the dealers perceived a "special relationship" between 
Amana and Cooper.  ISI, 614 A.2d at 140 (quoting Finlay, 369 A.2d 
at 546).  Dealers would address letters to Cooper as "Cooper 
Distributors, c/o Amana," App. 4101, and many dealers regarded 
Amana and Cooper as being "one and the same."  App. 1748; see 
                     
0Cf. Cassidy, 944 F.2d at 1138 (distributor required to "use its 
best efforts to diligently promote the sale of [the 
manufacturer's products"); Neptune, 462 A.2d at 599 
(distinguishing other cases where the plaintiff did not use its 
best efforts to promote sales). 
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also App. 1914 (testimony of a retail dealer that the dealers 
"always felt that Amana was sold through Cooper").   
 We recognize that Amana provided important evidence 
suggesting that it did not grant Cooper a license.  Nevertheless, 
taking all the evidence together, we hold that a reasonable jury 
could have inferred that there was a public perception that Amana 
vouched for Cooper's activities in relation to the Amana name.0  
  3.  New Jersey place of business.   
 The NJFPA applies only to an agreement "the performance 
of which contemplates or requires the franchisee to establish or 
maintain a place of business within the State of New Jersey." 
N.J.S.A. § 56:10-4.  In order to satisfy this third requirement, 
Cooper was required to show that the Agreement contemplated (1) 
that Cooper would operate a place of business ("POB") within the 
meaning of the NJFPA and (2) that this POB would be located in 
New Jersey.   
                     
0The fact that Cooper did not operate under Amana's trade name 
does not mandate a contrary result.  The New Jersey Supreme Court 
has expressly held that independently-named franchisees may still 
have a license from the franchisor.  As that court explained: 
 
[T]he inclusion of independently-named 
businesses is implicit in the Act's 
definition of franchise by the Act's 
limitation to a franchise "where more than 
20% of the franchisee's gross sales are 
intended to be or are derived from such 
franchise."  N.J.S.A. 56:10-4(3). 
 
ISI, 614 A.2d at 140.  "Therefore," the Court concluded, "if only 
a `mirror-image' relationship could constitute a franchise, the 
legislature would have added a superfluous requirement . . . that 
the franchise sales constitute twenty percent of the entire 
business."  Id. 
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 The NJFPA defines "place of business" as: 
a fixed geographical location at which the 
franchisee displays for sale and sells the 
franchisor's goods or offers for sale and 
sells the franchisor's services.  Place of 
business shall not mean an office, warehouse, 
a place of storage, a residence or a vehicle. 
 
N.J.S.A. § 56:10-3(f). 
 
 Cooper maintains that its showroom/marketing center in 
Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, constituted a POB.  There is ample 
evidence in the record that Cooper regularly used this facility 
for activities that were an integral part of the sales process. 
For example, the record shows that this facility was often used 
for product demonstrations, App. 2007-08 (sales manager Nathan 
met once a week with customers in showroom); App. 2005 (Nathan's 
three salesmen each used showroom two to four times a week for 
demonstrations), for dealer training, App. 2006-09, and dealer 
open houses.  App. 690.  Amana argues, however, that this 
facility was not a POB because Cooper did not actually consummate 
sales there.  See App. 1346-1404, App. 692, App. 1231, App. 1351-
52.  Relying on the statutory definition of a POB as a fixed 
location where "the franchisee displays for sale and sells the 
franchisor's goods,"  N.J.S.A. § 56:10-3(f) (emphasis added), 
Amana argues that the statute requires both activity leading up 
to the sale ("displays for sale") and the sale itself ("sells"). 
See Greco Steam Cleaning, Inc. v. Associated Dry Goods Corp., 608 
A.2d 1010, 1013 (N.J. Super. Law Div. 1992).  Consequently, Amana 
argues, Cooper's showroom did not constitute a POB within the 
meaning of the Act. 
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 We are constrained to disagree.  As a federal court 
sitting in diversity, "we are not free to impose our own view of 
what state law should be; we are to apply state law as 
interpreted by the state's highest court."  McKenna v. Pacific 
Rail Service, 32 F.3d 820, 825 (3d Cir. 1994).  Where a state's 
highest court has not squarely addressed an issue, we "must be 
governed by a prediction of how the state's highest court would 
decide were it confronted with the problem."  McKenna v. Ortho 
Pharmaceutical Corp., 622 F.2d 657, 661 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 
449 U.S. 976 (1980).  Relying on ISI, we predict that the New 
Jersey Supreme Court would hold that Cooper's activities at its 
showroom/marketing center were sufficient to constitute "sales" 
for purposes of the NJFPA.   
 In ISI, the New Jersey Supreme Court, in finding that 
ISI's Hackensack facility was a POB, noted that ISI "ha[d] been 
giving more than one hundred demonstrations a year" at that 
facility, ISI, 614 F.2d at 138, and that ISI had used the 
facility to acquaint prospective purchasers with the functioning 
of its product.  See id.  The court made no mention of any actual 
sales at the facility but instead relied exclusively on the 
demonstrations and inspections -- the very same types of 
activities that took place at Cooper's Englewood Cliffs facility. 
The New Jersey Supreme Court summarized its holding as follows: 
In short, the record sustains the trial 
court's finding that ISI set up a marketing 
facility in Hackensack where its customers, 
education professionals, can inspect the CCC 
computer system and receive a sales 
demonstration on the operation of its 
computer product.  ISI's Hackensack facility 
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thus could be found to constitute a "place of 
business" under the Act. 
 
ISI, 614 A.2d at 138.  Based on ISI, we feel compelled to predict 
that the New Jersey Supreme Court, if confronted with this case, 
would hold that Cooper's showroom/marketing center was a POB.0 
 Apart from requiring Cooper to establish that the 
showroom was a POB, the statute also obligated Cooper to show 
that the parties contemplated or required that the POB be located 
in New Jersey.  See N.J.S.A. § 56:10-4; see also Finlay, 369 A.2d 
at 545.  The ISI court explained that "a franchise would be 
governed by the Act whether the contract required a place of 
business in New Jersey or whether the parties reasonably 
anticipated that the franchisee would establish a New Jersey 
place of business."  ISI, 614 A.2d at 136.   
 We hold that a reasonable jury could have found that 
the parties "reasonably anticipated" that Cooper would establish 
a New Jersey POB.  Throughout its 31-year relationship with 
Amana, Cooper had its showrooms in New Jersey, first in Newark 
and then in Englewood Cliffs.  App. 683-701.  When Amana expanded 
Cooper's New York sales territory in 1982, Cooper declined to 
purchase Amana's Long Island facility, telling Amana that it was 
a New Jersey-based firm and would not "split [the] operation." 
App. 683.  Even Amana conceded that it "knew that Cooper's 
business was located in New Jersey."  Appellant's Brief at 32. 
                     
0Cooper argues that a reasonable jury could have found that 
actual order taking occurred at the showroom.  Since we hold that 
a POB exists even without order taking, we need not discuss this 
question. 
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Consequently, when the parties entered into the 1990 Agreement, 
these facts were more than enough to create a reasonable 
anticipation that Cooper would continue to have a POB in New 
Jersey during the life of the new Agreement.  See ISI, 614 A.2d 
at 136-37 (finding that a 1984 agreement contemplated a New 
Jersey POB because, in part, ISI had operated a marketing 
facility in New Jersey since 1977); Liberty, 806 F. Supp. at 1008 
(New Jersey location when first contracting with supplier is 
enough to give rise to inference of anticipation of New Jersey 
location).0   
 In sum, we hold that a reasonable jury could have 
concluded (1) that Cooper and Amana had a "community of 
interest," (2) that Amana granted Cooper a "license," and (3) 
that Cooper established a New Jersey POB.  Therefore, a 
reasonable jury could have found that Cooper had a franchise 
within the meaning of the Act.  Accordingly, we affirm the 
district court's denial of Amana's motion for judgment as a 
matter of law on Cooper's NJFPA claim. 
 
 B.  Jury Instructions 
                     
0Amana also argues that the ISI court, by suggesting that ISI 
could not sell its product without its facility, see ISI, 614 
A.2d at 138, implicitly held that a facility cannot constitute a 
POB unless the facility is necessary for the plaintiff's 
business.  A reasonable jury could have concluded, however, that 
Cooper's showroom was necessary to its business since there was 
evidence that the showroom was used for "important" 
demonstrations, App. 1231, and for "vital" sales training.  App. 
834. 
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 Amana contends that, even if it was not entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law on Cooper's NJFPA claim, it was at 
least entitled to a new trial due to the district court's 
allegedly erroneous jury instructions.  We review the district 
court's instructions to determine "whether the charge, taken as a 
whole and viewed in light of the evidence, fairly and adequately 
submit[ted] the issues in the case to the jury."  Limbach Co. v. 
Sheet Metal Workers Intern. Ass'n, 949 F.2d 1241, 1259 n.15 (3d 
Cir. 1991) (quoting Link v. Mercedes-Benz of North America, Inc., 
788 F.2d 918, 922 (3d Cir. 1986)).  We grant a new trial "only if 
the instruction was capable of confusing and thereby misleading 
the jury."  Link, 788 F.2d at 922.  When reviewing instructions, 
we consider "the totality of the instructions and not a 
particular sentence or paragraph in isolation."  In re Braen, 900 
F.2d 621, 626 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1066 (1991). 
Amana contends that the court gave improper instructions on each 
of the three franchise requirements.   
   1.  Community of interest.   
 The district court denied Amana's request for several 
jury instructions regarding community of interest.  First, it 
refused to give the following instruction: 
The fact that other brands or lines . . . may 
or may not presently be available for 
distribution by Cooper Distributing is not 
relevant to the issue of whether or not a 
community of interest existed between Amana 




App. 351.  Amana contends that Cooper was unable to find another 
product line to distribute due to market changes and that these 
changes could not convert Cooper's assets into franchise-specific 
assets.  Amana argues that the above instruction should have been 
given to ensure that the jury understood this point.   
 Without deciding whether Amana's argument regarding the 
effect of market changes under the NJFPA is correct, we hold that 
the district court's detailed and accurate community-of-interest 
charge (see App. 3901-05) taken as a whole was not capable of 
confusing the jury.  Not only did this instruction provide a 
clear and correct general description of this concept and the 
concept of franchise-specific assets, but the three specific 
types of investments that the instruction mentioned -- goodwill, 
product-specific knowledge, and inventory -- are not types of 
investments that could easily become non-transferable due to 
market changes.  The court told the jury that franchise-specific 
assets in this case might include: 
[B]usiness goodwill developed by Cooper with 
its customers associated with using Amana's 
name or built up by significant advertising, 
marketing, or promotional efforts with 
respect to Amana home appliances and not able 
to be transferred or utilized by Cooper 
outside of the relationship with Amana; . . . 
and any skill or knowledge Cooper gained in 
the marketing of Amana's home appliances 
which could not be used in selling other 
brands of home appliances, even if lines of 
appliances other than Amana were available to 
Cooper. 
 
App. 3905 (emphasis added).  Thus, looking at the instructions as 
a whole, we do not think that they were capable of leading the 
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jury into believing that assets rendered non-transferable merely 
by market changes could contribute to a finding of franchise-
specificity. 
 Second, the district court denied Amana's request for 
an instruction asking the jury to "consider whether the written 
contracts between Amana and Cooper Distributing required Cooper 
Distributing to direct all of its energy and resources to 
developing demand for Amana products."  App. 369 (emphasis 
added).  The district court did not err in refusing to give this 
instruction because Cooper, in order to prove a community of 
interest, was not required to show that it directed all of its 
energy and resources to promoting the sale of Amana products. See 
N.J.S.A. § 56:10-4 (minimum of 20% of gross sales must be from 
franchisor); New Jersey American, 875 F.2d at 63 (noting that "a 
firm may be considered a franchisee even if only 21% of its gross 
sales are derived from the franchisor").0 
    2.  License.   
 Amana argues that the district court erred in denying 
three requested jury instructions on the subject of whether Amana 
created a license.  First, Amana contends that the court should 
have given a charge stating that, in determining whether Cooper 
had a "license" at the time of termination, the jury should not 
                     
0The court also denied Amana's request for an instruction asking 
the jury to consider whether "the dealers to whom Cooper 
Distributing sold Amana products sold not only Amana but also 
other brands of appliances."  App. 376.  We do not think that 
this instruction had a bearing on whether Amana and Cooper had a 
community of interests and we consequently hold that the district 
court's failure to give this instruction was not erroneous. 
32 
consider certain practices that Cooper had already by this time 
abandoned, such as its previous practices (see App. 749-50) of 
performing in-home repair service on Amana appliances while 
displaying the Amana logo on its truck.  See App. 318.  We 
disagree.  As previously noted, the New Jersey Supreme Court has 
explained that "the term `license' means that the alleged 
franchisee must use the name of the franchisor `in such a manner 
as to create a reasonable belief on the part of the consuming 
public that there is a connection between the . . . licensor and 
licensee by which the licensor vouches, as it were, for the 
activity of the licensee.'"  ISI, 614 A.2d at 139 (citation 
omitted).  Cooper's past practices could be regarded as 
contributing to the public's perception of the relationship 
between Cooper and Amana.  We therefore hold the district court's 
denial of Amana's requested instruction was not erroneous.   
 Second, Amana contends that the district court erred in 
refusing to give an instruction asking the jury to consider 
whether Amana's products were "`off-the-shelf' type products that 
[could] be purchased at regular business outlets (such as 
appliance stores)."  App. 322.  We hold, however, that the 
district court's "license" charge as a whole was not capable of 
confusing the jury.  This instruction was based squarely on ISI. 
See App. 3899.  Under the NJFPA, the distinction between "off-
the-shelf" products and others is not of such critical 
significance that a specific instruction on this point was 
essential.    
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 Third, Amana argues that the district court erred in 
denying its request for an instruction asking the jury to 
consider whether the Agreement required Cooper to use its best 
efforts to promote Amana's name, as opposed to Amana's products. 
App. 329-330.  As previously noted, however, we view the 
distinction between the promotion of the Amana name and the 
promotion of Amana products to be of little substance in the 
context of this case.  See supra page 22.   
   3.  Place of Business. 
 The district court gave the following POB instruction: 
A place of business is defined as "a fixed 
geographical location at which the franchisee 
displays for sale and sells the franchisor's 
services." 
 
 . . .  
 
To meet the place of business requirement, . 
. . it is not necessary that the sale of 
goods include only order taking at the 
location.  Using the location for display and 
demonstration of the franchisor's goods to 
prospective customers is sufficient. 
 
App. 3899.  Amana contends that this charge was inaccurate, but 
we find Amana's argument to be without merit.  As noted, we 
predict that the New Jersey Supreme Court would hold that the 
actual taking of orders is not necessary and that demonstrations 
are sufficient in order to find a POB.  See supra pages 24-26.   
 In summary, we hold that the trial court did not err in 
denying Amana's motion for judgment as a matter of law or its 
motion for a new trial on Cooper's NJFPA claim.  We thus turn to 
the question of damages. 
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 C.  NJFPA Damages 
 The jury awarded Cooper $4.375 million in damages under 
the NJFPA.  App. 4794.  Amana requests a new trial on damages, 
arguing that the district court erred in upholding the verdict. 
Amana claims that the verdict was against the great weight of the 
evidence because the jury based its damages award on the false 
assumption that Cooper had a contractual right in the four-state 
territory to be Amana's exclusive distributor to retail dealers. 
App. 4954.  Because we agree that Cooper had no such right and 
because we additionally hold that the franchise was valued as of 
the wrong date, we remand for a new trial on damages. 
 We are mindful that our scope of review of a damages 
award is "exceedingly narrow."  Williams v. Martin Marietta 
Alumina, Inc., 817 F.2d 1030, 1038 (3d Cir. 1987) (quoting 
Walters v. Mintec/International, 758 F.2d 73, 80 (3d Cir. 1985). 
The district court's refusal to grant a new trial is reviewed for 
abuse of discretion.  See Frank Arnold Contractors, Inc. v. 
Vilsmeier Auction Co., Inc., 806 F.2d 462, 465 (3d Cir. 1986). We 
will reverse, however, when "the verdict is contrary to the great 
weight of the evidence, thus making a new trial necessary to 
prevent a miscarriage of justice."  Roebuck v. Drexel, 852 F.2d 
715, 736 (3d Cir. 1988).   
 In the current case, Cooper's valuation expert, Melvin 
Konner, in calculating the value of the Cooper franchise, assumed 
that Cooper had an exclusive right to sell to the retail dealers 
in its four-state territory and "that Amana had no right to sell 
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[to the dealers] direct[ly.]"  App. 1841.  Furthermore, Konner 
explained that his calculation of the value of the Cooper 
franchise would have been "considerably less" if "Amana did have 
the right to sell directly" to the dealers.  App. 18.  The jury's 
award appears to have been based on Konner's estimate.  As will 
be discussed below, however, see infra p. 36-42, Amana did not 
grant Cooper the exclusive right to sell to the retail dealers, 
and therefore Konner's assumption was incorrect.   Consequently, 
we hold that the jury's verdict was against the great weight of 
the evidence, and we therefore remand for a new trial on NJFPA 
damages. 
 We also find that the Cooper franchise was valued as of 
the wrong date.  The district court instructed the jury to value 
the franchise as of November 5, 1991, the date that Amana 
attempted to terminate the franchise, App. 2917, and Konner 
likewise calculated Cooper's value as that date.  App. 1780. 
However, as a result of the preliminary injunction entered by the 
district court, Cooper continued to operate its franchise until 
the date of judgment, March 8, 1994, which was also the date on 
which the district court dissolved the preliminary injunction. 
App. 5000-02.  Although Amana unquestionably attempted to 
terminate the Cooper franchise on November 5, 1991, the franchise 
was not effectively terminated until the dissolution of the 
preliminary injunction on March 8, 1994, since Cooper continued 
to operate and receive profits from the franchise until that 
latter date.  We therefore hold that the franchise should have 
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been valued as of that date, when Cooper actually stopped running 
the franchise. 
 Valuing the franchise as of the earlier date would 
bestow a double recovery on Cooper.  When franchises are valued, 
the "price should be approximately equal to the present value of 
all income that can be derived far into the future from the 
business."  Johnson v. Oroweat, 785 F.2d 503, 507 (4th Cir. 
1986).  This incorporation of future earnings into the current 
value of a business explains "why courts allow a plaintiff to 
recover either the present value of lost future earnings or the 
present market value of the lost business, but not both."  Id. at 
508; see also Arnott v. American Oil Co., 609 F.2d 873, 886 (8th 
Cir. 1979) ("[I]t is improper to permit a plaintiff . . . to 
recover both the value of the business as a going concern . . . 
and future profits of that business . . . .  Future profit 
potential is taken into consideration in valuing the business as 
a going concern."), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 981 (1980). 
Consequently, valuing the Cooper franchise as of November 5, 
1991, would give rise to a double recovery because Cooper would 
receive both (1) the value of the franchise as of the earlier 
date -- (which would include the present value of the future 
earnings from that date to the date of judgment)0 and (2) the 
actual profits derived from the franchise between the date of the 
attempted termination and the date of judgment.  To avoid this 
                     
0See App. 1799 (valuation expert Konner predicting "how [the] 
business [was] going to do" after 1991). 
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double recovery, we conclude that the proper date of valuation in 
this case is March 8, 1994.0 
    
III.  CONTRACT CLAIM 
 We now turn to Cooper's breach of contract claim.  In 
the early summer of 1991, a few months before the attempted 
termination, Amana began selling products directly to P.C. 
Richard, Cooper's largest dealer, App. 2309-13,0 and other local 
dealers.  Cooper asserted that the Agreement prohibited Amana 
from selling directly to such dealers in Cooper's territory and 
that therefore Amana was in breach.  The district court, after 
concluding that the Agreement was ambiguous as to Amana's right 
to make direct sales in Cooper's territory, App. 170-71, 
submitted the contract interpretation issue to the jury.  The 
court instructed the jury to consider course of dealing and 
course of performance evidence in determining whether Amana had 
the right to make such sales.  App. 3909-10.  Apparently relying 
                     
0The New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in Westfield Centre 
Services, Inc. v. Cities Service Oil Co., 432 A.2d 48 (N.J. 
1981), does not mandate a contrary result.  In its opinion in 
that case, the court observed that where a franchisor violates 
the NJFPA but is motivated by good faith business reasons, the 
franchisee's damages "should be measured . . . in terms of the 
actual or reasonable value of the franchisee's business when the 
franchisor cuts off the franchise."  432 A.2d at 55.  In the 
current case, Cooper's franchise should be viewed as having been 
effectively "cut[] off" when the preliminary injunction was 
vacated. 
 
0P.C. Richard, a local dealer, was an annual purchaser of $6 
million of Amana products, representing one-third of Cooper's 
total Amana business and 60% of Cooper's New York Amana sales. 
App. 910, 1014-16, 3955. 
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on such evidence,0 the jury concluded that Amana did not reserve 
the right to sell to dealers in Cooper's region and awarded 
Cooper $2 million for Amana's breach.  Amana maintains that the 
district court committed reversible error in concluding that the 
contract was ambiguous and in submitting the question of contract 
interpretation to the jury.  We agree.  
 The Agreement provides that any disputes under the 
Agreement are "subject to [the] laws of the State of Iowa."  App. 
3982.  Under Iowa law, the test for ambiguity is an objective 
one: "whether the language is fairly susceptible to two or more 
different meanings."  PMX Industries, Inc. v. LEP Profit Intern., 
31 F.3d 701, 703 (8th Cir. 1994) (citing Iowa Fuel & Minerals, 
Inc. v. Iowa State Bd. of Regents, 471 N.W.2d 859, 862-63 (Iowa 
1991)); see also Taylor v. Continental, 933 F.2d 1227, 1232 (3d 
Cir. 1991) ("A term is ambiguous if it is susceptible to 
reasonable interpretations.").  Furthermore, where a "written 
contract is unambiguous, Iowa law does not allow consideration of 
extrinsic evidence."  PMX Industries, Inc. v. LEP Profit 
International, 31 F.3d 701, 703 (8th Cir. 1994); see also Iowa 
Fuel, 471 F.2d at 862 (parties' intent determined by the words of 
the contract); Anderson v. Aspelmeier, Fisch, Power, Warner, & 
Engberg, 461 N.W.2d 598, 600 (Iowa 1990) (extrinsic evidence may 
                     
0See, e.g., App. 988 (testimony from Cooper's president and 
general manager, William Cooper, that, except for Amana's sales 
to the national accounts, Cooper had been the exclusive dealer 
for 30 years); App. 994 (announcement from Amana to the retail 
dealers in Cooper's area that Cooper was "the exclusive 
distributor of Amana's domestic appliances" in that region); App. 
3379-80 (testimony that Amana repeatedly told Cooper that Cooper 
had an exclusive sales territory). 
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not be used to modify, enlarge, or curtail the contract terms).0 
While extrinsic evidence, such as the course of performance 
evidence submitted to the jury in this case, may be admissible to 
"supplement[] or explain[]" the terms of the agreement, it cannot 
be used to contradict unambiguous terms.  Ralph's Distributing 
Co. v. AMF, Inc., 667 F.2d 670, 673 (8th Cir. 1981).  The 
decision whether a contract is ambiguous is one for the court to 
decide as a matter of law, see Boge v. State of Iowa, 309 N.W.2d 
8, 430 (Iowa 1981), and therefore our review is plenary. 
 We hold that the language of the Agreement between 
Amana and Cooper unambiguously provided for a non-exclusive 
distributorship arrangement and therefore that the district court 
erred in submitting to the jury the question of whether Amana 
reserved the right to sell directly to dealers in Cooper's 
territory.  One provision of the Agreement states:   
                     
0The Iowa Supreme Court has not addressed the question whether 
the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) applies to distributorship 
agreements under Iowa law.  However, In Corenswet, Inc. v. Amana 
Refrigeration, Inc., 594 F.2d 129 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 
U.S. 938 (1979), the Fifth Circuit applied the UCC to a 
distributorship under Iowa law, explaining: 
 
Although most distributorship agreements . . 
. are more than sales contracts, the courts 
have not hesitated to apply the Uniform 
Commercial Code to cases involving such 
agreements. 
 
Id. at 132 (citations omitted); see also Ralph's Distributing Co. 
v. AMF, Inc., 667 F.2d 670, 673 n.6 (8th Cir. 1981) (following 
Corenswet). 
 
    Assuming that the Iowa courts would apply the Iowa version of 
the UCC in this case, the result would not be affected.  Under 
Iowa Code § 554.2202, the express terms of the Agreement could 
not be contradicted by contrary course-of-dealing evidence.   
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[T]he Distributor [Cooper] shall have the 
non-exclusive right to purchase from Amana 
for resale . . . . 
 
App. 3979 (emphasis added). 
 
 Another even more specific provision states: 
 
Amana reserves the right to make sales 
directly or through other channels of 
distribution including, but not limited to, 
sales: (a) to any national, state or local 
government, or any agency or subdivision 
thereof; (b) for export; (c) to another 
manufacturer, (d) under trademarks other than 
Amana such as products manufactured under 
private label, (e) for commercial use; (f) to 
national accounts; (g) to general 
contractors, sub-contractors, builder 
distributor/dealers or developers of business 
or home building projects; (h) to leasing 
and/or rental accounts.  Any sales under this 
provision may be made by Amana without 
notice, compensation or other obligation of 
any kind to Distributor. 
 
App. 3981 (emphasis added).   
 In arguing that this provision is ambiguous, Cooper 
relies on the fact that sales by Amana to local retailers, such 
as P.C. Richard, are not specifically mentioned in the list 
contained in the provision.  But since this list is prefaced by 
the phrase "including but not limited to," this argument is 
unconvincing.  The list merely gives examples of entities with 
whom Amana reserved "the right to make sales directly."  By using 
the phrase "including, but not limited to," the parties 
unambiguously stated that the list was not exhaustive.  See 
Foods, Inc. v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm'n, 318 N.W.2d 162, 171 
(Iowa 1982) (noting that the "including, but not limited to" 
language created a considerably discretionary standard); In re 
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Forfeiture of $5,264, 439 N.W.2d 246, 251 n.7 (Mich. 1989) 
(inferring a broad construction from use of the "including, but 
not limited to" language); Jackson v. O'Leary, 689 F. Supp. 846, 
849 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (noting that the phrase "including, but not 
limited to" is "the classic language of totally unrestricted (and 
hence totally discretionary) standards").    
 Cooper's contention that our interpretation of the 
contract noted above should be governed by the rule of ejusdem 
generis is unpersuasive.  Under this rule of construction, 
general words near a specific list are "not to be construed to 
their widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to . . . 
things of the same general kind . . . as those specifically 
[listed]."  Black's Law Dictionary, 464 (5th ed. 1979); see also 
In re Syverson's Estate, 32 N.W.2d 799, 804 (Iowa 1948); Attorney 
General v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 4 N.W.2d 54, 58 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1988).  Assuming that sales to retail dealers are 
not of the same general kind as the other transactions listed in 
the Agreement, Cooper contends that we should infer that Amana 
cannot make such direct sales.  But the rule of ejusdem generis 
applies only if the provision in question does not express a 
contrary intent.  See In re Syverson's Estate, 32 N.W.2d at 804; 
Blue Cross, 4 N.W.2d at 58.  Thus, since the phrase "including, 
but not limited to" plainly expresses a contrary intent, the 
doctrine of ejusdem generis is inapplicable.  See In re 
Forfeiture of $5,264, 439 N.W.2d at 251 n.7 (noting that the rule 
of ejusdem generis did not apply because the proviso contained 
the "including, but not limited to" language); Ramirez, Leal & 
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Co. v. City Demonstration Agency, 549 F.2d 87, 104 (9th Cir. 
1976) (explaining that "including, but not limited to" language 
is "often used to mitigate" the rule of ejusdem generis); Blue 
Cross, 4 N.W.2d at 58. 
 In an effort to support its argument, Cooper cites 
other cases involving contractual language which, according to 
Cooper, withheld exclusive distributorship rights in language 
that was even clearer than that in the Agreement at issue here. 
This argument, however, misses the mark.  The question is not 
whether the Agreement could have been even more emphatic, but 
rather whether the language of the Agreement is susceptible to 
more than one reasonable interpretation.  Since we hold that the 
language is unambiguous, it is irrelevant whether even more 
forceful language might have been possible.  See PMX, 31 F.3d at 
703.  Accordingly, we hold that the Agreement unambiguously 
permitted Amana to make any direct sales it wished and that the 
introduction of contradictory extrinsic evidence in this regard 
was impermissible.0  We therefore reverse the judgment entered in 
                     
0Ralph's Distributing Co. v. AMF, Inc., 667 F.2d 670 (8th Cir. 
1981), is not to the contrary.  There, Ralph's Distributing 
Company, a wholesale distributor of snowmobiles, sued AMF, a 
snowmobile manufacturer that had entered into a franchise 
agreement with Ralph's.  Pursuant to the agreement, Ralph's was 
to buy the snowmobiles directly from AMF and then resell them to 
retail dealers in its designated territory.  When AMF began to 
sell directly to the retail dealers in Ralph's territory, Ralph's 
sued for breach of contract, alleging that AMF's direct sales in 
Ralph's territory violated Ralph's contractual right to be the 
exclusive distributor.  Interpreting Iowa law, the Eighth Circuit 
considered extrinsic evidence in interpreting the contract. 
Ralph's is distinguishable from the current case, however, 
because "the contracts designating Ralph's sales area [were] 
silent as to whether or not it would be the exclusive [AMF 
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favor of Cooper on its breach of contract claim and remand for 
the entry of judgment in favor of Amana on this claim.0 
 
IV.  TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH PROSPECTIVE 
BUSINESS ADVANTAGE 
 
 The jury found for Cooper on its claim for tortious 
interference with prospective business advantage, App. 4795-96, 
but the jury did not award any actual damages on this claim.  Id. 
The jury did, however, award $3 million in punitive damages.  Id. 
As the district court explained to the jury, Cooper's tortious 
interference claim was the only claim on which punitive damages 
were available.  App. 3921. 
 Under New Jersey law, the elements of a claim for 
tortious interference with prospective business advantage are as 
follows:  1) a prospective economic relationship from which the 
plaintiff has a reasonable expectation of gain; 2) intentional 
and unjustifiable interference with that expectation, and 3) a 
causative relationship between the interference and the loss of 
the prospective gain.  See Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp 
Electronics Corp., 563 A.2d 31, 37 (N.J. 1989). 
                                                                  
snowmobile] distributor in that territory."  Ralph's, 667 F.2d at 
673. 
0Amana argued that the judgment in favor of Cooper on the breach 
of contract claim should be reversed in whole or in part, for two 
additional reasons:  (1) because the district court allegedly 
gave incorrect jury instructions and (2) because Cooper's 
contract damages were duplicative of its recovery under the 
NJFPA.  Because we hold, for the reasons explained above, that 
Amana is entitled to judgment on Cooper's breach of contract 
claim, we need not reach either of these arguments.   
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 Cooper based its tortious interference claim on two 
independent sets of alleged facts: (1) Amana's sale of products 
directly to P.C. Richard and (2) other conduct in which Amana 
engaged after the district court preliminarily enjoined Amana 
from terminating the Cooper franchise.0  App. 3912-13.  The jury 
returned a verdict for Cooper on both bases,0 App. 4795-96, and 
the district court entered judgment in accordance with the 
verdict.  App. 5703-11.  
 Assuming arguendo that there was legally sufficient 
evidence to support the jury's finding of tortious interference, 
Amana contends that the award of $3 million in punitive damages 
must be reversed because the jury, by awarding $0 in actual 
damages, found that Cooper suffered no injury.  We agree with 
Amana's argument.   
 Under New Jersey law, a plaintiff must suffer some 
injury in order to recover punitive damages.  See Nappe v. 
Anschelewitz, Barr, Ansell & Bonello, 477 A.2d 1224, 1232 (N.J. 
1984) ("[P]unitive damages may be assessed . . . where some 
injury, loss, or detriment to the plaintiff has occurred.") 
(emphasis in original); Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 
F.3d 1153, 1195 (3d Cir. 1993).  Despite the jury's finding of $0 
                     
0For example, Cooper offered evidence that was intended to prove 
that, after the preliminary injunction, Amana intentionally 
delayed approval of an air conditioner sales program between 
Cooper and one of its largest dealers, Trader Horn.  App. 1047-
61; see also App. 1067-73 (evidence that Amana dropped Cooper 
from its mailing list and thus left Cooper unaware of discounts 
and model changes). 
0In light of our prior discussion concerning Cooper's breach of 
contract claim, the punitive damage claim could not be sustained 
based on the first theory set out above. 
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in actual damages, Cooper makes two arguments that it did suffer 
injury and that punitive damages were therefore permitted. First, 
Cooper claims that the finding of harm necessary to an award of 
punitive damages need not be monetarily measurable but can be 
intangible or unquantifiable.  Second, it claims that the jury 
"molded" the breach of contract verdict with the tortious 
interference verdict and that we should infer that the jury did 
award some actual damages for Amana's tortious interference. 
 As for Cooper's argument that it suffered intangible 
injury and was therefore entitled to a punitive award, the New 
Jersey Supreme Court has explained that a plaintiff need not show 
injury which gives rise to compensatory damages in order to 
receive punitive damages.  See Nappe, 477 A.2d at 1231-32.  The 
question we must answer is whether Cooper may recover punitive 
damages in the absence of an award of even nominal damages. 
 In Lightning Lube, we considered whether Lightning 
Lube, a lube oil dealer, could recover punitive damages from 
Witco, an oil equipment supplier, on Lightning Lube's fraud and 
misrepresentation claim where the jury found that the plaintiff 
had sustained no damages.  We held that in light of the jury's 
refusal to award nominal damages to the plaintiff, we could infer 
that the plaintiff did not suffer sufficient injury to warrant an 
award of punitive damages.  We explained: 
Inasmuch as the jury did not find sufficient 
injury to award nominal damages on this 
claim, the . . . fraud cannot sustain an 
award of punitive damages. 
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Lightning Lube, 4 F.3d at 1195.  Relying on Lightning Lube, Amana 
contends that because the jury did not find sufficient injury to 
award even nominal damages to Cooper, the tortious interference 
claim cannot sustain a punitive award. 
 The district court rejected Amana's argument by seeking 
to distinguish Lightning Lube.  App. 5708.  Whereas neither party 
in the current case requested a nominal damages instruction, the 
jury charge in Lightning Lube contained the following 
instruction: 
If you find that the defendant has violated 
the legal rights of the plaintiff in 
accordance with the law upon which I have 
instructed you, and if you find that the 
plaintiff has proven it has sustained damages 
but they are not computable, you may enter an 
award of nominal damages. 
 
App. 5708 (district court citing Lightning Lube jury 
instructions).  Based upon this instruction, it was clear that 
"the jury knew to award nominal damages expressly if it desired 
to do so,"  Lightning Lube, 4 F.3d at 1195, and therefore the 
jury's failure to award nominal damages in that case implied that 
the jury did not find any injury.  In the current case, the 
district court noted, no instructions on nominal damages were 
sought or given, and the district court therefore opined that the 
jury's finding of $0 in damages on Cooper's tortious interference 
claim could "not be read to imply a finding that Cooper had 
suffered no damages as result of Amana's tortious interference." 
App. 5710.  In addition, the district court stated that it could 
be inferred that the jury found that Cooper suffered actual harm 
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because the jury awarded punitive damages after being instructed 
that such damages could not be awarded unless "some harm to the 
plaintiff has occurred, even if intangible or unquantifiable." 
App. 3922.  Therefore, the district court held that the jury 
found that Cooper did suffer sufficient injury to warrant 
punitive damages. 
 We find the district court's reasoning unconvincing. 
Much like the jury in this case, the Lightning Lube jury was 
instructed that it could award punitive damages only if the 
"defendant ha[d] committed fraud or misrepresentation which had 
caused plaintiff damage."  App. 5721 (emphasis added).  Yet 
despite this instruction, we held that the jury's punitive 
damages award was improper because the jury there, as here, 
awarded $0 in actual damages.  Thus, the mere fact that the 
punitive damages instructions in this case required a finding of 
actual harm is insufficient to sustain the punitive damages 
award.    
 Moreover, we do not think that the fact that "the 
Lightning Lube jury was specifically made aware of the 
availability of nominal damages," App. 5708, can justify a 
contrary result.  We decline to accept Cooper's invitation to 
place the burden on the defendant to request a nominal damages 
instruction.  Cooper was the party seeking a finding of actual 
injury and, as such, bore the responsibility of requesting a 
nominal damages instruction if it wanted the jury to consider 
that option.  Of course, Cooper may well have decided for 
tactical reasons that it did not want the jury to consider that 
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option.  But whether Cooper failed to request an instruction on 
nominal damages by choice or inadvertence, it should bear the 
consequences.   Because Cooper did not request such an 
instruction, it cannot now contend that we should infer a finding 
of nominal damages.  See  Walker v. Anderson Electrical 
Connectors, 944 F.2d 841, 844-45 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding that 
plaintiff was not entitled to a presumption of nominal damages 
when she had failed to request them), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 
1043 (1993);0 Sims v. Mulcahy, 902 F.2d 524, 535 (7th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 897 (1990).0 
 We next address Cooper's contention that the jury 
"molded" the $0 tortious interference verdict with the $2 million 
breach of contract verdict and in fact awarded substantial 
compensatory damages on the tortious interference claim.  Cooper 
maintains that because there was evidence in the record that 
Cooper lost $1,959,000 as a result of Amana's direct sales to 
                     
0The Eleventh Circuit in Walker suggested that the reason that it 
placed the burden of such a request on the plaintiff was because 
she had something to gain by its absence.  The court, quoting the 
defendant's brief, noted that: 
 
[i]f there had been an instruction . . . on 
nominal damages, the jury might have given 
it, and that was a risk to be avoided by the 
plaintiff since she was after substantial 
money. 
 
Walker, 944 F.2d at 845 n.7. 
0Cooper's reliance on Singer Shop-Rite, Inc. v. Rangel, 416 A.2d 
965, 968 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.), certif. denied, 425 A.2d 
299 (N.J. 1980), is misplaced since Rangel explained that 
punitive damages will be upheld "where actual damage has been 
shown to accrue from the tortious act." 
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P.C. Richard, App. 4607, and because there was evidence in the 
record that Cooper lost $41,000 as a result of Amana's allegedly 
tortious post-injunction conduct, App. 4611, we should infer that 
the jury's $2 million breach of contract award was really a 
"molding" of its breach of contract verdict and its tortious 
interference verdict. 
 In support of its argument, Cooper relies on Universal 
Computers (Systems) Ltd. v. Datamedia Corp., 653 F. Supp. 518 
(D.N.J.), aff'd, 838 F.2d 1208 (3d Cir. 1988) (no published 
opinion).  In Datamedia, the jury found for the plaintiff on 
several theories, one of which, fraud, could have supported an 
award of punitive damages.  The jury, however, did not fill in 
the damages line on its special verdict form for any of the 
theories except the first one and instead left the line next to 
all the remaining theories, including fraud, blank.  See id. at 
532-34.  Concluding that the jury had misunderstood the verdict 
form and had aggregated all the damages on a single line, the 
district court held that in actuality the jury had awarded actual 
damages for fraud and that the award of punitive damages could be 
upheld.  See id. at 530.  Of course, Datamedia is not binding on 
us and, even if it were, it would be inapplicable here.  In this 
case, the jury did not leave a blank next to the line for 
tortious interference; instead the jury wrote "$0."  App. 4795-
96.  In the face of such an express finding of $0 damages, we 
refuse to infer that the jury "molded" its verdict and in fact 
awarded actual damages for tortious interference. 
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 This result is buttressed by the fact that the sum 
total of Cooper's alleged losses from its contract claim combined 
with Cooper's alleged losses from its tortious interference claim 
do not really equal $2 million, as Cooper erroneously suggests. 
Although there was evidence in the record that Cooper lost 
$1,959,000 as a result of Amana's direct sales to just P.C. 
Richard, App. 4607, there was also evidence in the record that 
Cooper lost $2,001,000 as a result of Amana's direct sales to all 
of Cooper's local retail dealers (i.e., P.C. Richard plus the 
other local retailers).  App. 4606.  Since the breach of contract 
verdict question on the special verdict form asked the jury to 
consider Amana's direct sales "to P.C. Richard and other 
dealers," App. 4794 (emphasis added), the facts do not support 
Cooper's inventive theory that the jury aggregated Cooper's 
claimed breach of contract damages with Cooper's claimed tortious 
interference damages.  Accordingly, we hold that, pursuant to the 
jury's verdict, Cooper suffered no actual harm as a result of the 
tortious interference claim, and we therefore reverse the 
district court's entry of the $3 million judgment for punitive 
damages in favor of Cooper and remand for the entry of a judgment 
of $0.0 
 
V.  PREJUDGMENT INTEREST 
                     
0Consequently, we need not address Amana's two alternative 
arguments (1) that the punitive damages did not bear a reasonable 
relationship to the actual damages and (2) that Cooper failed to 
prove that Amana acted with the malice necessary to warrant 
punitive damages. 
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 Last, we turn to Cooper's cross-appeal and its 
contention that it was entitled to prejudgment interest on its 
NJFPA award.  Applying New Jersey law, the district court denied 
prejudgment interest because "the injunction barring Amana from 
terminating Cooper precludes Cooper from convincingly arguing 
that it was denied the use of the value of its own business." 
App. 5739 n.2.  We agree with this holding,0 and we therefore 
affirm.   
 On appeal, Cooper argues that it is entitled to 
prejudgment interest on its NJFPA claim no matter whether that 
claim sounds in contract or tort.  In our view, however, Cooper 
is not entitled to prejudgment interest in either event.  If the 
NJFPA claim is analogized to a contract claim under New Jersey 
law, the award of prejudgment interest for claims arising in 
contract is subject to the discretion of the trial court.  See 
Meshinsky v. Nichols Yacht Sales, Inc., 541 A.2d 1063, 1070 (N.J. 
1988).  Traditionally, prejudgment interest was awarded in 
contract cases only on liquidated damages.  See George H. Swatek, 
Inc. v. North Star Graphics, Inc., 587 A.2d 629, 632 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 1991) (noting that historically, prejudgment 
interest was not awarded "where a . . . substantial controversy 
                     
0Cooper contends on appeal that, pursuant to the Agreement, Iowa 
law should govern.  However, since Cooper argued to the district 
court that "New Jersey's approach to prejudgment interest governs 
the franchise claim," App. 5193, we hold that Cooper failed to 
raise the argument that Iowa law should govern the prejudgment 
interest claim to the district court and that Cooper therefore 
cannot raise the argument for the first time on appeal.  See 
Harris v. City of Philadelphia, 35 F.3d 840, 845 (3d Cir. 1994) 
(declining to address a claim raised for the first time on 
appeal). 
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exist[ed] as to the amount due under a contract").  The rationale 
was that "the person who is liable for the debt does not know the 
sum he owes and cannot be in default until the amount he owes is 
determined by judgment."  Preston v. Claridge Hotel & Casino 
Ltd., 555 A.2d 12, 16 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989). 
However, "the rule that limited prejudgment interest awards to 
cases where damages were liquidated or clearly ascertainable in 
advance has been significantly eroded."  Meshinsky v. Nichols 
Yacht Sales, Inc., 541 A.2d 1063, 1070 (N.J. 1988); see also 
Swatek, 587 A.2d at 633 (prejudgment interest can be awarded 
"whether either liquidated or unliquidated damages are 
recovered").  Today, the purpose of an award of prejudgment 
interest is "to indemnify the claimant for the loss of what the 
moneys due him would presumably have earned if the payment had 
not been delayed."  Ellmex Construction Co., Inc. v. Republic 
Insurance Co., 494 A.2d 339, 349 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1985), certif. denied, 511 A.2d 639 (N.J. 1986).  As the New 
Jersey Supreme Court explained, "[t]he basic consideration is 
that the defendant has had the use, and the plaintiff has not, of 
the amount in question."  Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors 
Insurance Co. of America, 323 A.2d 495, 512 (N.J. 1974). 
 In the current case, at no time prior to the judgment 
did Amana have the use of Cooper's property.  We explained above 
that, due to the operation of the preliminary injunction, 
Cooper's franchise was not effectively terminated until the date 
of the court's dissolution of the preliminary injunction when the 
judgment was entered, see supra p. 35, and that, for practical 
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purposes, Cooper had the use of its franchise until that date. 
Consequently, at no time prior to judgment did Amana have the use 
of something of value owned by Cooper, and we therefore hold that 
the district court acted within its discretion by rejecting 
Cooper's request for NJFPA prejudgment interest predicated on a 
contract-based theory. 
 Cooper makes the alternative argument that its NJFPA 
claim should be considered to be in tort and, as such, should 
give rise to prejudgment interest pursuant to New Jersey Court 
Rule 4:-11(b), which provides for prejudgment interest on tort 
claims.  We hold that the fact that Cooper was not denied the use 
of its property until judgment precludes Cooper from receiving 
prejudgment interest even if Cooper's NJFPA claim is viewed as 
sounding in tort.  Since Cooper's franchise existed until the 
date of judgment, we affirm the district court's holding that 
Cooper was not entitled to prejudgment interest.0 
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 For the reasons explained above, we affirm the district 
court's denial of Amana's motion for a judgment as a matter of 
law and its motion for a new trial on the NJFPA claim.  We 
reverse the district court's denial of a new trial on NJFPA 
                     
0Alternatively, Cooper claims that the district court erred by 
failing to award Cooper prejudgment interest in light of Amana's 
alleged aggravated misconduct.  See W.A. Wright, Inc. v. KDI 
Sylvan Pools, Inc., 746 F.2d 215, 219 (3d Cir. 1984) (egregious 
conduct warranted prejudgment interest).  Again, however, we 
decline to award prejudgment interest where the plaintiff was not 
deprived of the use of his property until judgment. 
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damages and remand for a new trial on that issue consistent with 
this opinion.  We reverse the judgment in favor of Cooper on its 
breach of contract claim and remand for the entry of judgment for 
Amana on that claim.  We reverse the award of $3 million in 
punitive damages to Cooper on its tortious interference claim and 
remand for the entry of a judgment for $0.  We affirm the 
district court's denial of Cooper's motion for prejudgment 
interest.  Each side will bear its own costs.0 
                     
0While a sharing of costs often follows a decision in which each 
side has prevailed on one or more issues, in this case we take 
the occasion to note that even if Cooper had prevailed, we might 
not have awarded it costs because of the excessiveness of the 
footnotes in its otherwise helpful and persuasive brief. This 
court's local rules explicitly state that "excessive footnotes in 
briefs are discouraged."  See LAR 32.2(a).  The effect was not 
only to make the brief more difficult to read, but it meant that 
many pages contained more than the 27 lines of double-space text 
permissible under LAR 32.1(c). 
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SLOVITER, Chief Judge, concurring and dissenting. 
 I am happy to join the majority's careful and persuasive opinion in all respects 
except one:  although I believe it is a close question, I cannot agree that the 
Distributor Agreement unambiguously permitted Amana to sell directly to all dealers in 
Cooper's territory.  I believe that the district court did not err in determining that the 
distributorship agreement between Amana and Cooper was ambiguous and in submitting that 
issue to the jury.  Moreover, I believe that once the issue was properly before the jury, 
there was adequate evidence from which the jury could have found that Amana's decision to 
sell directly to P.C. Richard & Son, Cooper's largest account, and to other local dealers 
was a breach of contract. 
 The majority bases its decision that the agreement unambiguously reserved to 
Amana the right to sell to retail dealers such as P.C. Richard on (1) the designation of 
Cooper's "right to purchase from Amana for resale" as "non-exclusive" and (2) the preface 
of Amana's reservation of "the right to make sales directly or through other channels of 
distribution" to listed categories with the words "including, but not limited to, sales" 
to those categories.  Admittedly, the contract reflects an understanding that Cooper's 
right to sell was not exclusive, even within its territory, and that the listing of 
certain categories to which Amana could sell was not exhaustive, but it does not 
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necessarily follow that Amana unambiguously reserved the right to sell directly to every 
customer in Cooper's territory. 
 The first provision on which the majority relies states that the "Distributor
shall have the non-exclusive right to purchase from Amana for resale."  App. 3979 
(emphasis added). Patently, this does not apply to Amana itself.  The "purchase for 
resale" presumably applies to companies such as Cooper, which sell to retailers, and the 
provision's applicability to P.C. Richard, which sells only to consumers, is unclear.  
Thus, there is some ambiguity whether or why this provision has any application to Amana's 
right to sell directly to a local retailer. 
 The other provision on which the majority relies is the reservation clause.  
Here Amana did indeed reserve the right to make sales "directly or through other channels 
of distribution" and prefaced the list of the other "channels of distribution"  
with the words "including, but not limited to."  App. 3981.  I find this more ambiguous 
than does the majority because none of the enumerated categories resembles a local retail 
account, such as P.C. Richard, and Cooper was unlikely to be in a position to sell 
effectively to any of the enumerated accounts.  The point is not that we could say with 
certainty that Amana did not reserve the right to make direct sales to retailers, but 
merely that the issue is not clear as a matter of law.  This is markedly different than 
the contract that was at issue in Manchester Equipment Co. v. Panasonic Indus. Co., 529 
N.Y.S.2d 532, 533 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. App. Div.), appeal dismissed, 531 N.E.2d 299 (N.Y.), 
appeal denied, 534 N.E.2d 329 (N.Y. 1988), where Panasonic had expressly reserved "the 
unrestricted right to solicit and make direct sales of the Products to anyone, anywhere
(emphasis added). 
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 Moreover, under Iowa law, the language reserving sales to Amana should not be 
read in isolation.  The ambiguity vel non of contractual language must be determined by 
looking at the contract as a whole.  As the Iowa Supreme Court said in Freese v. Town of 
Alburnett, 125 N.W.2d 790, 792 (Iowa 1964), "[A]mbiguity appears when a genuine doubt 
appears as to the meaning of a contract, and the instrument must be construed as an 
entirety." Moreover, "a contract will not be interpreted giving discretion to one party in 
a manner which would put one party at the mercy of another, unless the contract clearly 
requires such an interpretation."  Iowa Fuel & Minerals, Inc. v. Iowa State Bd. of 
Regents, 471 N.W.2d 859, 863 (Iowa 1991). 
 In Freese, the issue was whether a contractor who had drilled a well for a town 
under a contract requiring him to "[f]urnish and install all equipment for test pumping" 
for a "[l]ump sum [of] $500.00" had an obligation to conduct a second test pumping after 
the well caved in.  125 N.W.2d at 792.  The town contended that the contract unambiguously 
required the contractor "to test pump [the] well as many times as was necessary to satisfy 
the Town's engineer, for the sum of $500.00, in order to complete his basic contract."  
Id.  The trial court, after considering evidence presented, refused to accept this 
contention and found the contract ambiguous, a somewhat different approach to ambiguity 
than followed by those courts which look only to the contract.  The Supreme Court of Iowa 
stated:   
 
Considering the evidence that this is a time-consuming and costly 
operation and that the contractor was required to follow implicitly 
the directions of the engineer, the trial court found considerable 
doubt as to the meaning of this contract provision.  We must agree. 
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Id.  The Court then stated, "It would be most unfair and inequitable to hold [the 
contract] required the contractor to perform this expensive task as often as required by 
the engineer."  Id. at 793. 
 Thus, we must look in the first instance at the entire contract to ascertain 
whether it is consistent with all of its provisions to construe the provisions relied on 
by Amana as unambiguously giving it the right to sell directly to Cooper's largest 
customer, one who accounted for one-third of its total Amana sales, and 60% of its New 
York Amana sales.  In making this inquiry, I do not suggest that a court should interpose 
terms into the contract that it deems fair and equitable but merely that the court should 
decide from an objective standard whether the provision on which the party relies is 
unambiguous when read in context of the entire contract. 
 In this case, we should look at whether the obligations that the Distributor 
Agreement imposes on Cooper are consistent with a reservation to Amana of the right to 
sell directly to retailers in Cooper's territory.  Like the Iowa Supreme Court in Freese
I have "considerable doubt" whether they are, especially considering that 78% to 100% of 
Cooper's business was derived from the sale of Amana products.  For example, Cooper was 
required to use its best efforts to promote sales and "[t]o accept a minimum quota 
determined by Amana based on sales potential in the territory."  App. 3979.  Such a sales 
quota would be meaningless if Amana could undersell Cooper at will by selling directly to 
Cooper's customers.  In addition, the Agreement obliged Cooper to "purchase and maintain 
an appropriate inventory of all Products in accordance with Amana's written programs and 
policies."  Id.  Such a provision had the potential of stranding Cooper with useless 
inventory if Amana could sell directly to the retailers. 
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 Reading the contract as a whole, I believe it is ambiguous as to whether Amana 
had the right to sell directly to retail dealers in Cooper's territory, and that the 
district court did not err in submitting the question of contract interpretation to the 
jury.  Therefore, I respectfully dissent in that respect. 
